Small Arrow This widely anticipated book addresses fundamental questions in international and comparative politics: why do democratic leaders typically govern with less corruption, more prosperity, and less war for their peoples? Bruce Russett Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations, Yale University Online Attention Mouseover for Online Attention Data Overview Praise Summary The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy.
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Start your review of The Logic of Political Survival Write a review Shelves: political-science This treatise divided into three consecutive constructive parts, presents theories of governance and political survival, depicts a series of hypothesis, theories, and arguments.
Their ideas formulate that since political survival depends on followers support, one puzzle they propose several is what keeps autocratic leaders, who more often than not, bring less security and prosperity to their constituents than their democratic counterparts, longer in power than the last ones; In other This treatise divided into three consecutive constructive parts, presents theories of governance and political survival, depicts a series of hypothesis, theories, and arguments.
By doing so, they miss many other interpretations of what makes up good governance practices. They apply a mathematical-statistical method to test their ideas. By building on Hobbes observation as cited in Bueno de Mesquita et al.
The top 3: 1. Democrats offer their citizens more peace and, by some accounts, more prosperity than autocrats. Yet autocrats last in office about twice as long, on average, as do democrats. Why is this so? Bueno de Mesquita et al. Problem: Not always. Components of exceptionalism? Why would any authoritarian state adopt universal adult suffrage as part of its political system?
Can the choice to produce peace and prosperity or war and misery be shown to follow from the same factors that influence preferences for government institutions and the time leaders survive in office?
Two pillar ideas are those of the selectorate and of the winning coalitions, which they elaborate on under the theory of the selectorate one of several addressed. According to their findings a winning coalition of supporters is at the base of political survival, however the size more considered in their research and form less mentioned of that coalition affects the political-economical formula of governance policies and institutions.
One problem is that the authors consider three kinds of decisions for the leaders to keep in power, however, the three of them are institutional and economical taxation, material benefits , and in instances, leaders act out of them. What about governance by fear, division, inclusion, exclusion, psychographic distribution of strategies, etc.? By this observation, the second part of the book can be flawed. Argument: in a democracy, W winning coalitions are large, whilst in autocracies, winning coalitions are small both cases in relation to the size of S ; Not necessarily.
The work misses that there is no such thing as an absolute democracy or absolute autocracy; in pragmatic terms, there are only tones of greys in terms of regimes. Relativity should come into play. Argument: A smaller W favours kleptocracy. An example is the U. When the authors discuss the role of the IMF and of the World Bank in bailing out governments leaders out of financial crisis, they imply that the problem is that by doing that, these institutions obstruct reform and foster corruption, however, they fail to place these trans-governmental institutions as an active part of S, which would mean that S influence can be observed from more perspectives than indicated.
This is particularly applicable in the extension of the work towards war. In conclusion, this work is as contributing as the limits imposed by the authors of the study. Within these demarcations variables , this book answers more than satisfactory to the posed puzzles, however, its generalisation and applicability comes into question, because of the same reasons.
Perhaps political survival is a case-by-case, an object of study and that the essence of strategy is precisely the adaptation of different courses of action, according to multiple factors, which depends on time and space of occurrence.
The Logic of Political Survival